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Abstract
This paper develops a novel approach by which to identify the price of oil at the time
of depletion; the so-called "terminal price" of oil. It is shown that while the terminal
price is independent of both GDP growth and the price elasticity of energy demand, it
is dependent on the world real interest rate and the total life-time stock of oil resources,
as well as on the marginal extraction and scarcity cost parameters. The theoretical
predictions of this model are evaluated using data on the cost of extraction, cumulative
production, and proven reserves. The predicted terminal prices seem sensible for a
range of parameters and variables, as illustrated by the sensitivity analysis. Using the
terminal price of oil, we calculate the time to depletion, and determine the extraction
and price proles over the life-time of the resource. The extraction proles generated
seem to be in line with the actual production and the predicted prices are generally in
line with those currently observed.
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1 Introduction
There are two main strands to the literature on exhaustible resources, and on the modelling
of oil prices and supplies in particular. In one of these strands, a number of models seek
to explain particular developments in oil prices mainly relying on tools from the industrial
organisation literature to do so. In the other, the focus has been on the application of the
Hotelling model to the oil market. While the former strand aims to model the price and
extraction of oil over time, its models generally only explain individual events, such as the
rst oil shock, and not the evolution of oil prices over time (for an extensive survey of these
models see Crémer and Salehi-Isfahani (1991)). On the other hand, the Hotelling model
and its extensions develop theoretical models that yield predictions governing the rate of
change of oil prices, but on their own they are not able to determine the level of oil prices
and/or the prole of oil production in the world economy. Neither of these two modelling
approaches helps in determining the optimal price of oil at the time of resource exhaustion.
Rather, such terminal prices are assumed a priori, independent of the modelling strategy
under consideration. In addition, most of these models from both strands typically abstract
from the single most important factor determining energy demand, namely the real GDP, in
their demand specications. This is an important shortcoming in a growing world economy
where real output is expected to rise over the foreseeable future.
In this paper, instead of looking at the growth rate of oil prices, see for instance Lin
and Wagner (2007), or assuming what the price level will be at the time of depletion, as in
Khanna (2001), we use a new approach to identify the price of oil at the time of depletion;
referred to as the "terminal price" of oil, P t;Tt. We show that the terminal price of oil does
not depend on any of the demand function parameters. Thus the particular demand function
chosen is not relevant for estimation of P t;Tt. In fact it is illustrated that P

t;Tt
net of marginal
extraction cost () is only determined by the real interest rate (r) and the estimates of the
total amount of the resource available (TRt) scaled by , the scarcity coe¢ cient. As such
our framework allows for the possibility of new discoveries or revisions to the total amount
of the resource available, which in turn will lead to an update in the estimate of the terminal
price.
Furthermore, we specify a demand function for total energy and model the demand for
oil as a fraction of this. Our setting allows the share of oil in total energy to decrease as
other energy products increasingly take on more of the share of oil (as has been happening
over the past three decades). Thus, a substitution e¤ect of oil for other energy products is
implicitly present in the model. We also include real output in our demand specication to
capture the outward shifting energy demand curve.
We use annual data on extraction costs and production from 1975 to 2008 for a panel of
57 major oil producers to estimate the parameters of the cost function. Using these estimates
and data on cumulative extraction and proven reserves, we estimate the terminal price of
oil. The predicted terminal price seems sensible for a range of parameters and variables
as illustrated by the sensitivity analysis. The terminal price and estimates of the demand
function, obtained using annual data from 1965 to 2009 for a panel of the 65 largest oil
consuming countries, are used to determine the price and extraction proles, as well as the
time to depletion (Tt). The predicted prices of the model are close to the ones recently
observed and the extraction proles generated seem to be in line with the actual production:
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they are increasing over time and are in the right magnitude.
The rest of the paper is set out as follows: Section 2 gives a brief review of the relevant
literature while Section 3 sets up and develops our theoretical model. Section 4 describes the
data and the methodology used to estimate the cost and demand functions, and presents the
estimation results which are used to determine the terminal price. In Section 5 we describe
the methodology used to calculate the time to depletion as well as the predicted extraction
and price proles of our theoretical model. Finally, Section 6 o¤ers some concluding remarks.
2 Literature Review
The two oil shocks in the 1970s generated a great deal of interest in the oil market. In
order to understand and explain the way in which oil markets behave, a number of models
were developed, mainly using tools from the industrial organisation literature. Some of these
models emphasised the oil market as being non-competitive and the role of the Organisation
of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) as a price maker. Others assumed OPEC to have
no market power and therefore emphasised the role of perfect competition in the oil markets.
Within this literature three di¤erent types of non-competitive models can be identied:
the rst stressed the role of OPEC as a monolithic cartel (Pindyck (1978b) and Gilbert
(1978)), the second group only considered a subset of OPEC to be a cartel (Hnyilicza and
Pindyck (1976) and Eckbo (1976)), while the third group perceived there to be a dominant
producer that held market power (Mabro (1975), Adelman (1985), and Erickson (1980)).
On the other hand, the competitive models can be broken down into four di¤erent cat-
egories. These focused on either property rights (Mabro (1986), Johany (1980), and Mead
(1979)), supply shocks (MacAvoy (1982) and Verleger (1982)), exhaustibility and expecta-
tions (Gri¢ n (1985) and Salehi-Isfahani (1995)), and target revenues (Bénard (1980), Crémer
and Salehi-Isfahani (1980), and Teece (1982)) as reasons for the development of oil prices
since the rst oil shock.
However, none of these models can explain the evolution of oil prices or production in the
past (or the future), although they are usually very good at explaining individual events such
as the rst or second oil shock. For instance, while the property rights model does a fairly
good job at explaining the price increases during the rst oil shock (1973/74), it does not
explain the price increases in the two subsequent oil shocks (1978/79 and 1990/91). Similarly,
while the target revenue model can partly explain the evolution of oil prices in certain periods,
one can argue that governments do not set production of oil solely on the basis of balancing
their budgets. Moreover, empirical tests of the non-competitive models show that OPEC
can at best be described as a weak cartel with loose coordination amongst the member
countries, see for instance Gulen (1996) and Salehi-Isfahani (1987). This result is also more
recently supported by Marcel and Mitchell (2006) and Lin (2008) among others, who argue
that while OPEC was a successful cartel in the rst few decades after its establishment, the
organization has not been successfully colluding over the past two decades. More importantly,
the competitive and non-competitive models do not specify what oil prices will be when
exhaustion is approached, nor do they give predictions for the actual price level.
Another branch of the literature takes a more theoretical approach by modifying and ex-
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tending the pioneering work of Hotelling (1931).1 Some of these studies introduce exploration
and allow for the development of elds (Pindyck (1978a)), while others model uncertainty in
the exploration production function (Devarajan and Fisher (1982)), or introduce backstop
technology (Heal (1976) and Khanna (2001)). A number of papers attempt to model the
cost function in particular: for instance, Slade (1982) proposes a cost function that depends
on the output of the mine as well on the grade of the mineral, while Lin et al. (2009) allow
for endogenous technology-induced shifts in the cost function. Although there are many
articles that focus on adjusting the Hotelling model in one way or another so that it explains
the price path of oil as observed, they generally focus on modelling the rate of change of oil
prices rather than establishing what the actual price levels are, or what price will prevail
in the period in which the last barrel of oil is extracted. In other cases, they make specic
assumptions regarding what prices will be at the time of depletion as in Khanna (2001), or
they x the time to depletion, see for instance Lin (2007).
Thus, to our knowledge, there do not seem to be any papers which consider the deter-
mination of the terminal price of oil. At the same time, very few models in the literature
include a world income variable in their oil demand specication, and even those that do
fail to consider the total demand for energy as a determinant of the demand for oil in their
modelling strategy. This is an important shortcoming in a growing world economy where real
output is expected to rise over the foreseeable future. These shortcomings will be addressed
in our theoretical model developed in Section 3.
3 The Theoretical Framework
3.1 The General Framework
Suppose that over the period t  1 to t, the production or extraction of the resource is given
by qt and let Qt denote the cumulative extraction at the end of period t, so that:
Qt =
tX
= 1
q = Q0 +
tX
=0
q (1)
where Q0 is the initial stock and is taken as given. Denote the amount of proven reserves
outstanding at time t by Rt and the total amount of the resources available as TRt; the
subscript t indicates that the estimate of the total available resource may vary over time,
either due to data revisions or because of new resource discoveries. In order to do empirical
analysis we take TRt to be known at any given point in time. Then it must be the case that
at any point in time, t:
TRt  Rt +Qt (2)
1Although the rst theoretical work on the economics of exhaustible resources has been attributed to
Hotelling (1931) two much less complete papers had already dealt with this issue; Gray (1914), assuming
constant prices for the resource but an increasing marginal extraction cost, developed a model looking at
the optimisation problem of a single mine, while Fisher (1930) looking at the allocation of hard-tack by
shipwrecked sailors, noted that the price of hard-tack increased with the interest rate.
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Using (1) and (2), and assuming that (2) is satised with equality, we obtain the resource
constraint:
Rt +Qt = Rt 1 +Qt 1
Rt  Rt 1 = Qt 1  Qt
Rt  Rt 1 =  qt: (3)
The cost of extraction at time t, Ct(qt; Rt 1), is assumed to be given by a convex function
in qt as well as depending negatively on the amount of remaining proven reserves, the so-
called stock e¤ects. This type of cost specication is also considered by Livernois and Uhler
(1987), Farzin (1992), and Favero et al. (1994) among others. It is mainly because of
the pressure dynamics a¤ecting petroleum extraction that costs vary negatively with the
remaining reserves. According to these dynamics, the deeper the level of extraction, the
lower the pressure, and so the more costly extraction becomes. This is because, for instance,
either water or gas has to be injected to stimulate production. But even without the presence
of pressure dynamics, it is still the case that extraction becomes more cost-intensive as the
depth of the eld increases.
We use a similar cost function to that of Favero et al. (1994), although whereas they
assume that the cost function is quadratic in the rate of extraction and linear in the remaining
reserves, we assume that cost of production is linear in the rate of extraction, and quadratic
in the level of remaining reserves, or cumulative extraction:
Ct(qt; Rt 1) = qt +
1
2
 (TRt 1  Rt 1)2 > 0;  > 0;  > 0: (4)
The above separable formulation allows the second term to be associated with the "scarcity
cost" and the rst term to be associated with the extraction cost.
We model consumers as being indi¤erent to various sources of energy, such as coal,
natural gas, oil, and nuclear. Thus it is appropriate to rst look at the demand for energy
before determining the specic demand for oil. The main reason for this is that although
its composition will change, demand for energy will continue to be present even beyond the
terminal date of the depletion of oil and gas reserves. Much of the literature dealing with
the Hotelling model and its extensions, for instance Lin (2009), does not include an output
e¤ect in modelling the energy demand. However, it is crucial to include a variable for real
GDP in the demand function for energy, or the demand for its individual components, as
it is the single most important variable for determining demand and thus consumption. In
light of the above discussion we are dealing with the shortcomings in the literature when it
comes to specifying an appropriate demand function for exhaustible resources by dening
the total per capita demand for energy at time t (Dt), when the real price of energy is PE;t,
to be given by an energy demand function which responds positively to the increasing world
per capita income (Yt), thus allowing for an outward-shifting demand curve as world GDP
increases, and negatively to the real price of energy:
Dt = AY
1
t P
2
E;t: (5)
where 1 and 2 are the income and price elasticity of demand respectively.
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For empirical estimation of the demand function we use the actual values of real GDP
per capita, however, when it comes to determining the time to depletion, Tt, and the price
and extraction proles we will assume that real GDP is growing at a constant rate, that is:
Ys = e
g(s t)Yt; s > t; (6)
s = t+ 1; t+ 2; :::; T; T + 1; ::: ;
where Yt is the value of real GDP per capita at the time in which we forecast from and g is
the growth rate of real GDP.
Looking at Figure 1 it is reasonable to assume that a fraction of total energy consumption
(t) is provided by oil. However, this fraction has been changing over time with a downward
trend. While oil consumption peaked in 1973 and was 48 percent of total energy consumption,
it reached an all-time low of roughly 35 percent in 2009, with a mean of 41 percent between
1965 and 2009. Thus, using the total energy demand equation (5), we can write the demand
for oil as:
qdt = tDt = tAY
1
t P
2
E;t; (7)
It must then be the case that when there are no remaining reserves from which to extract,
t = 0 and the amount of oil supplied is equal to zero. We set the real price of oil per barrel
(Pt) as a constant mark-up (%) on the real price of energy, namely
Pt = %PE;t; (8)
where % can also capture the taxation of oil relative to taxes on other energy sources by the
consuming countries. This is justied by the assumption that the price of energy per unit of
e¤ective energy, for instance million tones of oil equivalent, must be approximately the same
for all energy sources. The demand for oil can then be written as:
qdt = A
1 1 2
t (tYt)
1

t
%
Pt
2
: (9)
Finally, we assume that at any given time t the market price adjusts such that supply is
equal to demand. In other words, we ignore the year on year changes in stocks.
3.2 The Optimisation Framework
To simplify we assume, along with Pindyck (1978a) and Lin (2009) among others, that the
oil market is perfectly competitive. This is equivalent to the case of a social planner who has
the sole property right of all the oil in the world and sets the competitive price. We do not
look at the oligopolistic case, given that oligopolistic competition is likely to a¤ect short-run
prices and not the long-run prices that we are concerned with in this paper. Thus we look
at the social planners problem and dene qt as the the total amount extracted at time t by
all the rms.
The social planners problem is then to choose an extraction prole so as to maximise the
discounted stream of prots over the life of the eld given the resource constraint dened in
equation (3) conditional on the information set 
t 1 formed at t  1. That is:
max
qt;qt+1;:::
Rt;Rt+1;:::
E
(
TtX
h=0
h [t+h(qt+h; Rt+h 1) + t+h(Rt+h  Rt+h 1 + qt+h)] j 
t 1
)
; (10)
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where 0   < 1 is the discount factor [ = 1=(1 + r)], r > 0 is subjective rate of discount
which we shall set equal to the real interest rate, t+h is the lagrange multiplier, and t+h is
the prot function dened by:
t+h(qt+h; Rt+h 1) = Pt+hqt+h   Ct+h(qt+h, Rt+h 1) (11)
Thus we are explicitly assuming Tt is the time to depletion; the subscript t indicates that
the time to depletion is endogenous, and as a result may vary as we change the date from
which we forecast.
The rst-order conditions for the above optimisation problem are given by:
Et 1

dt+h
dqt+h

+ Et 1(t+h) = 0; (12)
Et 1

dt+h+1
dRt+h

+ Et 1(t+h)  Et 1(t+h+1) = 0; (13)
where Et 1 denotes expectations conditional on the information set 
t 1. Given our cost
function (4) we have:
dt+h
dqt+h
= Pt+h   dCt+h(qt+h; Rt+h 1)
dqt+h
= Pt+h   ; (14)
and:
dt+h+1
dRt+h
=  dCt+h+1(Qt+h)
dQt+h
 dQt+h
dRt+h
=
dCt+h+1(Qt+h)
dQt+h
= Qt+h: (15)
Hence given equations (12) - (15) the rst-order conditions can be written as:
Et 1 (Pt+h   ) + Et 1(t+h) = 0; (16)
Et 1 (Qt+h) + Et 1(t+h)  Et 1(t+h+1) = 0: (17)
Since t+h is unobserved we need to eliminate it in order to derive a pricing rule. Noting
that we can iterate equation (16) forward one period and write it as:
  Et 1 fEtt+h+1g = Et 1 fEt (Pt+h+1   )g ; (18)
which assuming expectations are formed consistently can in turn be written as:
  Et 1 (t+h+1) = Et 1 (Pt+h+1   ) : (19)
Substituting for equation (19) in (17) and using equation (16) to eliminate t+h in (17):
Et 1 (Qt+h)  Et 1 (Pt+h   ) + Et 1 (Pt+h+1   ) = 0; (20)
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which simplies to the pricing rule:
Et 1 (Pt+h   ) = Et 1(Pt+h+1   ) + Et 1 (Qt+h) ; h = 1; 2; :: : (21)
Note if  = 0, then (21) is the Hotelling rule, namely price of resource net of marginal
extraction cost (here ) is expected to rise with the discount rate, r.
Suppose that at time t, and given the estimate of the total resource at the time, TRt,
complete depletion is expected to occur at time t + Tt, namely Tt periods ahead of the
estimation date, t. We refer to Tt as the "time to depletion". Setting h = Tt we now have
Et 1 (Pt+Tt) = (1  ) + Et 1(Pt+Tt+1) + Et 1 (Qt+Tt) : (22)
Since oil is expected to be depleted at time t + Tt, it must be that Et 1 (Qt+Tt) = TRt
and Et 1 (qt+Tt+1) = 0; that is in the period after which the last barrel of oil is extracted,
extraction of oil must be equal to zero and the total cumulative extraction must be equal to
the estimate at time t of total resource available. Hence:
Et 1 (Pt+Tt) = (1  ) + Et 1(Pt+Tt+1) + TRt: (23)
We now need to specify the expectations of real oil prices in the period after which oil is
depleted, namely we need to specify a value for Et 1(Pt+Tt+1). It would not be appropriate
to use the demand function for oil given in (9) at t + Tt + 1 to nd out what prices will
prevail at time t+ Tt + 1. The reason for this is that we have assumed that the period after
the depletion of oil resources, t+Tt+1 = 0; and so there is no demand relationship between
real oil prices and oil production in the period t+Tt+1; in other words, there is no oil left in
this period for a transaction price to exist. Instead we need to set Et 1(Pt+Tt+1) to the price
of non-oil energy expected in the period immediately after which oil is completely depleted.
It is clear that the analysis can be carried out for any given choice of Et 1(Pt+Tt+1), which
is in accordance with the random walk model of oil prices and is likely to produce a good
approximation. But to simplify the analysis in what follows we assume that Et 1(Pt+Tt+1) =
Et 1 (Pt+Tt), namely the expected price of non-oil energy, in oil equivalent units, is the same
as the expected terminal price of oil. In a continuous time setting this would correspond to
the smooth pasting condition often used in the solution of stochastic di¤erential equations.
Under these conditions and denoting the expected terminal price of oil formed at time t by
P t;Tt = Et 1 (Pt+Tt), we have
P t;Tt = P

t;Tt + (1  )+ TRt
= +

(1  )TRt
P t;Tt = +


r

(Qt +Rt) (24)
Therefore, the terminal price of oil, P t;Tt, is then uniquely dened by equation (24). Note
that for the innity horizon case, one can derive the same result as in (24) by using the
pricing equation (21) and letting the time horizon go to innity. It is interesting to note
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that the terminal price does not depend on any of the demand function parameters, thus the
particular demand function chosen is not relevant for estimation of P t;Tt. In fact, P

t;Tt
net of
marginal extraction cost, , is only determined by the real interest rate (r) and the estimates
of the total amount of the resource available (TRt) scaled by , the scarcity coe¢ cient.
If exhaustion was not an issue then it must be the case that the scarcity cost parameter
is equal to zero ( = 0) and thus the terminal price (24) is such that price is equal to
marginal extraction cost; which is indeed the pricing rule that will be followed by competitive
producers.
Remember that the estimate of total resources available (TRt) is made up of two parts:
cumulative production (Qt) and amount of proven reserves (Rt), see equation (2). For any
given time Qt cannot be revised in the sense that we always know how much has been
extracted (although this is subject to measurement errors). However, this is not the case
for Rt which may be revised upwards or downwards. Thus, our framework allows for the
possibility of discovering new reserves or revision to the total resource at any given time
period. From equation (24) we see that if the total resource available is revised upwards the
terminal price should then increase. This is an interesting property of the terminal price as
it appears counter-intuitive, since we usually think of the price declining as supply increases.
But note that an increase in TRt while implying that more of the resource is available it
also means that future costs of extraction will increase as the cost function (4) is increasing
in cumulative extraction with a positive . If  = 0, this e¤ect is not present and we return
to the case of a competitive producer with an inexhaustible resource.
As suspected an increase in the marginal extraction cost () implies an increase in the
terminal price, as does an increase in the scarcity parameter (). On the other hand an
increase in the subjective rate of discount (r) leads to a fall in the terminal price of oil.
4 Empirical Application
Our aim is to estimate the terminal price of oil (P t;Tt) for di¤erent values of t over the period
2000-2010. In order to do that we need to estimate the marginal extraction cost () and
the scarcity cost parameter (), as well as have an estimate of the total resource available
(TRt) in the world at any given time t. Thus we require data on annual and cumulative
extraction, proven reserves, cost of extraction, as well as an estimate of the subjective rate
of discount (r) which we shall set equal to the real world interest rate. Moreover, in order to
determine the time to depletion (Tt) and the extraction prole of the resource over the time
of depletion, not only do we need to know the terminal price, but we also need to estimate
the demand function parameters as well as the share of oil in total energy demand (t).
The data used for the estimations are described in detail in Section 4.1. The results of
the estimations of the cost and demand functions are reported in Sections 4.2.1 and 4.2.2,
respectively. Using the estimated cost function parameters, we determine the prevailing
terminal prices for the years 2000-2010 in Section 4.3. In addition, we examine the range
within which these prices are predicted to lie when the real interest rate is allowed to vary
within a 0.5 percent band and also when the scarcity parameter lies within its estimated 95
percent condence interval. In Section 5 we will use the estimated parameters of both the
cost and the demand functions as well as the predicted terminal prices to determine the time
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to depletion and to examine the shape of the extraction and price proles.
4.1 Data
We use annual data for the period 1965 to 2009 on oil extraction and consumption for
the largest oil consuming and producing countries, see Table 1. Our dataset covers 65 oil
consuming countries, which together account for 93.4 percent of the total crude oil demanded,
and 57 oil producing countries, which together produce 99.2 percent of total oil in the world.
These two series are obtained from the British Petroleum (2010) Statistical Review of World
Energy and the OPEC (2010) Annual Statistical Bulletin. Thus our sample of countries is
very comprehensive and capture the world as a whole pretty well. In addition, we have data
on total proven reserves and oil prices from British Petroleum (2010) for the years 1980-
2010 and 1965-2009 respectively. Finally, we have access to average extraction costs from
World Bank (2010b) for the 57 oil producing countries in our sample from 1975 to 2008. A
more detailed description of how the variables in our dataset was constructed and its sources
are provided in Table 2.
All prices in the dataset are in terms of current US dollars per barrel (Brent dated),
but in order to compares prices across time we use the US consumer price index (CPI) to
deate the oil prices and the extraction costs to 2009 US dollars. From now on whenever
we refer to the price of oil, unless otherwise stated, it is the real price of oil per barrel.
Table 3 provides summary statistics for real oil prices and average extraction costs as well
as world oil consumption, extraction and proven reserves. It is clear from this table that
real world average costs are signicantly lower than real oil prices. As will be explained,
there is also wide cross country variations in extraction, prices, and proven reserves over this
period. The reserve to extraction ratio reported in Table 3, more commonly known as the
reserve-production ratio in the literature, indicates that global oil supplies should run out in
roughly 40 years if oil production remains at the current rate, assuming of course that there
are no signicant new discoveries or technological advances over this period.
Figure 2 shows the world production of oil in million barrels per day. The sharp drop in
extraction between 1979 and 1984 is explained by the fact that Saudi production was falling
dramatically during this period as it was restricting its own production to keep oil prices at
the 1979 level. Saudi production having been at 10.6 million barrels per day (mbd) in 1980
was less than 2 mbd in the summer of 1985. As 2 mbd was not a sustainable extraction level
for the Saudis, and as no other members of OPEC were adhering to their quotas, it forced
the Saudis to drop their target. As can be seen, world extraction has been increasing year
on year since then. Figure 2 also plots the daily world consumption of oil. As expected there
is a strong co-movement between extraction and consumption.
The evolution of the real price of oil is depicted in Figure 3. Real oil prices were relatively
stable following the Second World War and up until 1973, with the average price (at 2009
US prices) during this period being around $13.75 per barrel. However, prices increased sub-
stantially in 1973/4 as the Organisation of Arab Petroleum Exporting Countries (OAPEC)
excluding Iraq, decided to introduce production cutbacks as well as an embargo on the US
and Netherlands (the rst oil shock). Between 1975-1978 the real price stayed at the same
level, but then increased substantially once again in 1978/79 due to two supply disruptions:
the Iranian Revolution and the Iran-Iraq War (the second oil shock). Between 1981 and
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1985 prices fell sharply even though Saudi production was falling dramatically, see Figure 2.
However, in September of 1985, Saudi production was increased from 2 mbd to 4.7 mbd and
the price dropped from $54.95 to $28.25 in real terms.
Iraqs invasion of Kuwait in August 1990, causing extraction in both countries to cease,
and the threat to damage Saudi oil facilities caused the price to increase to around $38.94.
However, as soon as the war ended, and with it the threat of damage to Saudi oil production,
prices immediately dropped to $31.51. The price of oil was stable between 1990-2002 uctu-
ating between $22.90 and $35.50 (prices only dropped below $20 for a brief period in 1998/99
due to Asian crisis). However, since 2002 the real oil price has increased substantially from
$29.84 to around $104 at the end of December 2011.
To determine the terminal price we require data on cumulative extraction (Qt). This is
obtained by summing qt over the years 1965 to 2009 and adding cumulative extraction before
1965 using data from British Petroleum (2010) and OPEC (2010). Thus we are implicitly
setting Q1965 = 129 billion barrels. As we also have data on proven reserves, Rt, we are
able to calculate the resource available, TRt, using equation (2); that is, the total amount
of the resource at time t, TRt, is the sum of the cumulative production Qt and the amount
of proven reserves Rt: Figure 4 shows the estimate of the total resource available as well
as the estimates for proven reserves from 1980, as this is the rst year in which data on
proven reserves were collected. As can be seen in 1988, 1990 and 2003 there was an upward
revision in proven reserves of roughly 27, 18 and 10 percents respectively. It is important
to note that there have also been episodes in which proven reserves have been revised down
slightly (1984/85 and 1991/92). As explained in Section 3, our theoretical framework allows
for these revisions.
Note that proven reserves at any given point in time are dened as "quantities of oil that
geological and engineering information indicate with reasonable certainty can be recovered
in the future from known reservoirs under existing economic and operating conditions",
British Petroleum (2010). Thus this measure could be unreliable. However, given that the
estimates for proven reserves are consistent across a number of sources, see for instance
British Petroleum (2010) and United States Department of Energy (2010), and given that
at present there are no better ways of estimating the remaining oil reserves in the world, we
make use of this measure.
4.2 Empirical Results
4.2.1 Cost of Extraction
For country i the cost of extraction function is given by:
Cit = iqit +
1
2
 (TRit 1  Rit 1)2 + "it: (25)
Section 3.1 discussed the theoretical reasons for why the cost function should be linear in
the rate of extraction and quadratic in cumulative production. However, to reduce the
possibility of having trended series and to allow for heterogeneity it is better to divide (25)
by qit. Therefore, we estimate the average cost function instead of the total cost function
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given above, that is we estimate:
Cit
qit
= ACit = i +
1
2

(TRit 1  Rit 1)2
qit
+ uit
= i +
1
2

(Qit 1)2
qit
+ uit;
= + i +
1
2

(Qit 1)2
qit
+ uit; (26)
where i is the country specic residual and  is the mean of i.
As previously discussed, we have priors on the sign of both cost parameters from the
set-up of the model and economic theory. In order to capture the stocks e¤ectof extraction
we expect  > 0. In addition, the estimate of the marginal extraction cost, , must be
positive. Given that i is correlated with Qit 1, pooled OLS and the Random E¤ects (RE)
estimators are inconsistent for , however, the Fixed E¤ects (FE) estimator is consistent. As
such we report the results from pooled OLS, RE, and FE estimations, but will reply on the
FE coe¢ cients when calculating the terminal price.
Table 4 reports the results of the estimation of equation (26) using panel data between
1975 to 2008 for the 57 oil producers in our dataset. As expected, the marginal cost is
positive and so is the parameter of the stocks e¤ect. In fact the pooled OLS and RE
coe¢ cients are not that di¤erent than those of the FE ones. The results in Table 4 conrm
that the marginal extraction cost being roughly $5 is small and as such should not play a
large role in determining the terminal prices (24) which must be signicantly higher than
$5. Therefore, it must be the case that both the scarcity cost parameter () and the real
interest rate will be the main drivers of the terminal price.
4.2.2 Demand for Oil
Following Pesaran et al. (1998) and Pesaran et al. (1999), we employ the Pooled Mean
Group (PMG) estimator to estimate the relationship between the di¤erent variables in the
demand function, see equation (9). The PMG estimator is an intermediate case between
the averaging and pooling methods of estimation, and involves aspects of both. It restricts
the long-run coe¢ cients to be homogenous over the cross-sections (countries), but allows
for heterogeneity in intercepts, short-run coe¢ cients (including the speed of adjustment)
and error variances. The PMG estimator also generates consistent estimates of the mean
of short-run coe¢ cients across countries by taking the simple average of individual country
coe¢ cients. It can be argued that country heterogeneity is particularly relevant in short-run
relationships when it comes to the demand for oil, given that countries impose subsidies
and taxes on energy to di¤erent degrees. On the other hand there are often good reasons
to expect that long-run relationships between variables are homogeneous across countries.
Estimators that impose cross-sectional restrictions (PMG) dominate the fully heterogeneous
ones (Mean Group) in terms of e¢ ciency if the long-run restrictions are indeed valid.
We apply the methodology of Pesaran (2006) to the PMG estimator to correct for the
cross-sectional dependencies that arise in the error terms from unobserved global factors,
since we assume that countries are a¤ected in di¤erent ways and to varying degrees by
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these shocks. The Cross-sectionally augmented Pooled Mean Group (CPMG) estimator is
particularly appropriate for our analysis as we are interested in the long horizon estimate of
the terminal prices (P t;Tt) and the time to depletion (Tt) as well as the extraction and price
proles and as such need to estimate the long-run oil demand relationship.2
Using annual data on oil consumption, prices and real GDP per capita between 1965
and 2009 for 65 major oil producers we employ the CPMG method to estimate the following
equation:
 ln (qit) = i ln (qit 1) + 0ixit +
p 1X
j=1
ij ln (qit j) +
s 1X
j=0
0ijxit j + i + "it
+biln (qt) + ciln (yt) +
p 1X
j=0
lijln (qt j) +
s 1X
j=0
gijln (yt j); (27)
where  ln (qit) is the rate of change in the logarithm of oil consumption per capita (qit) for
country i and year t, xit is a 2  1 vector of explanatory variables including the logarithm
of real per capita GDP, ln (yit), and the log of the real oil prices, ln (pit). i is the country-
specic e¤ect and "it is the error term with a zero mean and constant variance. ln (qt),
 ln (qt), ln (yt) and ln (yt) denote the simple cross section averages of ln (qit),  ln (qit),
ln (yit) and ln (yit) in year t. For now we will set the share of oil in energy consumption equal
to its mean; in other worlds t =  = 0:41, and thus treat as constant. In Section 5.2.1 we
will look at the e¤ects on the extraction prole as well as the time to depletion when we
allow t to be declining over time.
To eliminate cross country dependencies, arising from omitted common factors (e.g. time-
specic e¤ects or common shocks) that might inuence the countries di¤erently, the cross
sectional averages of oil consumption and real GDP per capita are included in the CPMG
estimator. Note also that the order of the ARDL process must be chosen to be long enough
to ensure that residuals of the error-correction model are serially uncorrelated and that the
regressors are weakly exogenous. Thus we allow the lag order to be chosen by the Schwarz
Criterion (SBC) subject to a maximum lag of two on each of the variables, in other words
p = s  2.
Table 5 presents the cross-sectionally augmented Mean Group (CMG) and Pooled Mean
Group (CPMG) estimates as well as the Hausman test statistics, distributed as chi-squared
examining panel heterogeneity.3 According to the Hausman statistics, the homogeneity
restriction is not rejected for individual parameters as well as jointly in all our regressions.
Thus, we focus on the results obtained using the CPMG estimator, which, given its gains
in consistency and e¢ ciency over the alternative CMG estimator, is more appropriate. The
results in Table 5 indicate that the error correction coe¢ cients, i, fall within the dynamically
stable range being statistically signicant and negative, and therefore the null hypothesis of
no long-run relation is rejected.
Our results suggest a price elasticity of demand of -0.15, which falls in the range of the
estimates obtained in the literature. For instance, Pesaran et al. (1998) nd a elasticity of
2For a detailed discussion of the CPMG estimator and its advantageous over alternative panel estimation
methods see Cavalcanti et al. (2012).
3The individual country results are not reported here but are available upon request.
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between 0.0 to -0.48 for Asian countries, Gately and Huntington (2002) report elasticities
between -0.12 to -0.64 for both OECD and non-OECD countries, and Krichene (2006) obtains
estimates of between -0.03 to -0.08 for various countries. Moreover, although our estimate
for the income elasticity of demand (0.678) is lower than what is reported in Pesaran et al.
(1998) for Asian developing countries (1.0-1.2), it is in line with the estimates of between 0.53
to 0.95 and 0.54 to 0.90 in Gately and Huntington (2002) and Krichene (2006) respectively.4
4.3 Alternative Estimates of the Terminal Price
The data for the total amount of the resource available, TRt, for the years 2000 to 2010 is
reported in Table 6. While TRt is time dependent, depending on both cumulative extraction
(Qt) and proven reserves (Rt), see equation (2), it is taken as xed at the start of any
given time period for empirical application. Using TRt, the estimate of the cost function
parameters in equation (4), see Table 4, and setting the world interest rate at 1.5 percent
per annum we now calculate the terminal price using:
P t;Tt = +


r

TRt (28)
The fourth column of Table 6 reports the benchmark case, which using the 2010 esti-
mate of the total resource available (TR2010 = 2513), predicts a terminal price of $131.36.
The table also illustrates that using data on TRt between year 2000 and 2010 P t;T varies
between $104.77 to $131.36. This large range is due to new discoveries and technological
improvements over the last decade which resulted in an upward revision of around 22 percent
in proven reserves. These predictions seems sensible given that the average price of oil in
2008, 2009, and 2010 was $96.91, $61.67, and $80.39 respectively, well below the predictions
of our theoretical model for these three years. In fact the predicted terminal price of $131.36
is very close to the projected value of $133.22 in the Energy Information Administration
(2010) International Energy Outlook for the year 2035.
Given the signicant role of both the scarcity cost parameter () and the interest rate
in determining the terminal price it is important to evaluate how sensitive P t;T is to the
estimates of these parameters. The analysis shows that the terminal price is highly sensitive
to the level of the world real interest rate, see columns three and ve of Table 6. At the low
value, one percent level, no matter the size of the total resource, P t;Tt is predicted to be large
lying between $154.60 and $194.98. On the other hand, for a high value interest rate of two
percent per annum the terminal price lies in the range of $79.85 and $99.80. Thus, allowing
the real interest rate to vary between one and two percentage points and using the current
level of estimated total resource, the terminal price of oil is predicted to lie in the range of
$99.80 and $194.98.
We set the real interest rate at 1.5 percent, as this is the more realistic case at present,
and examine the sensitivity of P t;T to changes in the stocks e¤ect parameter, . Using the
2010 estimate of the total resource, the terminal price is between $100.30 and $162.38 when
 lies in the 95 percent condence interval, see columns 6-7 in Table 6. Note that when
4See also Fattouh (2007) for an extensive survey of the literature on income and price elasticities of
demand.
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 = 0:00094, the price lies in a much higher interval of $129.26 to $162.38 as compared to
the benchmark case. Thus there is considerable uncertainty in the terminal price of oil.
In the remainder of the paper we will focus on the benchmark case in which the real
world interest rate is set to the current level of 1.5 percent,  is set to its point estimate of
0:00075, and the total resource is set to its 2010 value of 2513 billion barrels, which yields
the terminal price of $131.36 in real terms (2009 US dollars).
5 Extraction and Price Proles
Having estimated the cost function and the demand function parameters and the resulting
terminal prices in Section 4, we will now turn our attention to establishing the time to
depletion as well as the resulting extraction and price proles from the start date to the time
of depletion.
5.1 Methodology
For any given start date t, using the estimated demand elasticities in Table 5 (b1 and b2)
we calculate the amount extracted in the last period qt+bTt :
qt+bTt = A1 b1 b2t+bTt
 
t+bTtYt+bTtb1 t+bTt% P t;bTt
b2
; (29)
where Yt+bTt is the real GDP in the last period and is given by:
Yt+bTt = eg(bTt t)Yt; (30)
in which g is the average real GDP growth rate and P 
t;bTt is the terminal price, see Table 6,
in the last period obtained using:
P 
t;bTt = b+
 b
r
!
(Qt +Rt) : (31)
Having established the terminal price and the amount extracted in the last period, we
work backwards to get price and extraction estimates of the next to the last period, bTt   1.
We use the pricing rule derived in Section 3.2 and the resource constraint in equation (3) to
obtain the estimate of prices in period bTt   1, namely:
Pt+bTt 1 = (1  ) b+ (P t;bTt) + b  Qt+bTt 1
= (1  ) b+ (P 
t;bTt) + b  TRt   qt+bTt : (32)
As we have estimated the marginal extraction cost, the scarcity parameter, and the
terminal price in Section 4 and also have an estimate of the total amount of the resource
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available we are able to compute Pt+bTt 1. Using this value we can determine the extraction
in the next to the last period, namely:
qt+bTt 1 = A1 b1 b2t+bTt 1
 
t+bTt 1Yt+bTt 1b1 t+bTt 1% Pt+bTt 1
b2
= A
1 b1 b2
t+bTt 1

t+bTt 1Yteg(bTt t 1)
b1 t+bTt 1
%
Pt+ bTt 1
b2
: (33)
Again we work backwards and determine the prices that prevail two periods before the
time of depletion, that is:
Pt+bTt 2 = (1  ) b+ (Pt+bTt 1) + b  Qt+bTt 2
= (1  ) b+ (Pt+bTt 1) + b  TRt   qt+bTt   qt+bTt 1 ; (34)
and make use of Pt+bTt 2 and the demand function parameters to work out the extraction in
this period:
qt+bTt 2 = A1 b1 b2t+bTt 2
 
t+bTt 2Yt+bTt 2b1 t+bTt 2% Pt+bTt 2
b2
= A
1 b1 b2
t+bTt 2

t+bTt 2Yteg(bTt t 2)
b1 t+bTt 2
%
Pt+bTt 2
b2
(35)
We keep working backwards solving for prices in each period and then the extraction rate
until the cumulative production in period t reaches the same level as that of the base year t.
5.2 Application
We use the method described above and let the base year for our prediction be the end of
2010. Moreover, we set the average annual world GDP growth rate at 3.2 percent, which
is equal to the benchmark growth rate used in Energy Information Administration (2010)
to calculate energy demand for the years 2007-2035 (but it is also close the to the actual
average growth rate of 3.8 percent for the years 1965-2009). Initially we will assume that the
share of oil in energy demand remains constant, but Section 5.2.1 will investigate di¤erent
cases in which the share of oil declines as it has done for the past three decades.
In 2010, the sum of proven reserves and the cumulative extraction was estimated at
2513 billion barrels. Setting the real world interest rate at the current rate of 1.5 percent
the resulting terminal price is calculated to be $131.36 per barrel, see Table 6.5 Given
TR2010 = 2513 and P t;Tt = $131:36 we estimate the time to depletion to be in 2044, in other
words, T2010 = 34.
Figure 5 depicts the extraction prole for the benchmark case, and clearly shows that
with an outward shifting demand curve, production will be increasing over time until oil is
depleted in 2044. In general the basic model generates extraction proles that seem quite
5We use the point estimate of the terminal price here ($131.36), but the exercise in this section can be
carried out for any value of the terminal price, which has an upper bound of $194.48 in 2010 (see Table 6).
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sensible; rstly because they are exhibiting the same upward trend as the actual extraction
proles. This can be seen in Figure 2 which shows that the production of oil has been
increasing every year since 1984. Secondly, because the predicted values are not far o¤ from
the actual ones: oil consumption is predicted to be 83.7 million barrels per day in 2011 which
is very close to the actual 82.1 million barrels per day produced in 2010, see British Petroleum
(2010).
Looking at the predicted price prole of the model (Figure 5) we see that the oil price
in 2011 is predicted to be on average $113.83 per barrel, which is not far o¤ from the actual
average prices of $104 in 2011 and the current prices of around $110 (February 2012). Just
like extraction, the model predicts that prices should increase over time, reaching $131.36 at
the time of depletion. Interestingly our model suggest that the price should be $129.5 per
barrel in 2030 which is close to the predicted range of $125.69 to $136.92 in Lin (2009) for
2030.
These forecasts are made with all the available information at time t  1, in our case end
of 2010. However, the results are dependant on a number variables and parameters, with
changes in each of them having implications for the terminal price and the time to depletion.
Therefore, these predictions need to be updated with the arrival of new information. In
particular, given the year on year increase in proven reserves and production levels, see
Figures 2 and 4, we expect TRt to increase overtime. This upward revision in TRt has two
e¤ects: (i) it increases the time to depletion for any given demand specication and output
growth and (ii) it increases the terminal price. This is indeed the case for the past decade
in which the predicted terminal price increased from $104.77 in 2000 to $131.36 in 2010, see
Table 6.
How then does our prediction regarding extraction and prices proles compare with the
work of others? Pindyck (1978a) and Pindyck (1978b) develop models that generate price
proles that increase over time and extraction proles that increase for a large period of the
life-time of the resource, while Favero et al. (1994) derive an extraction prole that is hump-
shaped, with initially increasing but eventually decreasing extraction rates. However, since
these studies do not include real GDP in their models, we would indeed expect extraction to
eventually decrease. On the other hand, Khanna (2001) illustrates how extraction increases
monotonically until the resource is depleted. Thus, it seems that with real GDP included
as a variable, an increasing extraction and price prole over the life-time of the resource is
generally supported by the literature.
5.2.1 Scenario Analysis: Share of Oil in Total Energy Falling
So far we have assumed that the share of oil in total energy consumption, t, is constant.
Although t does not a¤ect the terminal price it does have an impact on the time to depletion
(Tt) and as a result on the extraction and price proles. Given that the share of oil has been
declining for the past 36 years (Figure 1), we should allow for this to obtain more realistic
extraction and price proles. In particular, with the share of oil falling over time, we would
expect that extraction and price proles would shift downwards, in other words the growth
rate of both extraction and prices should be lower.
Assuming that the share of oil declines with 0.91 percent per year, as it has done on
average over the past three decades, the time to depletion is shifted forward with ve years
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to 2049 as compared to the benchmark case. As expected the extraction prole is now shifted
downwards, see Figure 6. The prediction of this more realistic scenario is in fact very close
with those of the Energy Information Administration (2010), see Figure 7. More specically,
production in the International Energy Outlook reference case is forecasted to increase over
time and reach 110.60 million barrels per day in the last year of their forecast 2035, which
is almost equal to our prediction of 110.42 million.
On the other hand assuming that the share of oil will decline at double the rate of which
it has been for the past 36 years, i.e. 1.82 percent per year, the extraction prole is still
increasing over time but the rate of growth of extraction is now substantially smaller. As a
result the time to depletion increases by 12 years, as compared to the benchmark case, and
is predicted to be in 2056. Moreover, as can be seen from Figure 8, the price prole is shifted
inwards resulting in lower prices for every period until depletion.
It is interesting that if the share of oil in total energy consumption is assumed to decline
with 2.73 percent per year (three times the current rate), not only does time to depletion
increase by 25 years (thus shifting the year of depletion to 2069) but extraction is expected to
decrease for each year until oil is depleted. Moreover, the predicted prices are now exhibiting
a much lower growth rate than in the other three cases, see Figure 8.
6 Concluding Remarks
This paper developed a theoretical framework to endogenously determine the level of oil
prices at the time of depletion, the "terminal price" (P t;Tt), and provide predictions for the
price level over the life-time of the resource. It was shown that the terminal price depends
on the marginal extraction and scarcity cost parameters, as well as on the real interest rate
and the total amount of the resource available (TRt), but not on the GDP growth rate or
any parameters of the demand function. Our framework also allowed for the possibility of
updates in the estimate of the total resource, such as new discoveries or revisions to the
amount of proven reserves. An upward revision in TRt had two e¤ects: (i) it increased the
terminal price and (ii) it increased the duration time to depletion for any given demand
elasticity and output growth rate.
Using cross-country data on extraction costs from 1975 to 2008 and on oil demand from
1965 to 2009, we estimated the parameters of our model and determined the terminal prices
for the years 2000 to 2010. Our analysis showed that prices were sensitive to the real interest
rate and the scarcity coe¢ cient, as well as to the estimated total resource available. However,
for almost all variations of these parameters, the terminal prices seemed sensible. Using
these prices, our framework allowed us to calculate the time to depletion and outline the
extraction and price paths, working backwards. In general, the basic model developed seems
to generate predicted prices that are in line with the ones recently observed and sensible
extraction proles; they exhibit the same upward trend as the actual production and predict
values that are not far o¤ the current ones.
Looking at predictions made at the end of year 2010, we illustrated that in the more
realistic case of a steady fall in the share of oil in total energy consumption, while terminal
prices will remain una¤ected, the time to depletion will be shifted forward resulting in a
lower rate of oil price rises and production in each period. With the share of oil falling at
18
the rate which has been witnessed over the past three decades (0.91 percent), the time to
depletion is shifted forward by ve years to 2049. Moreover, we illustrated that the predicted
extraction levels under this scenario were very close to the ones forecasted by the Energy
Information Administration (2010) in their reference case. However, if one assumes that the
rate of decline will be at 2.73 percent per year, due to more recent serious investments in
alternative energy sources, the time to depletion is shifted forward by as much as 25 years
to 2069, almost double as compared to the case with a constant share. In addition, under
this scenario the extraction prole is signicantly altered as production will decline for every
year until depletion.
The research in this paper can be extended in a number of directions. In particular, it
would be interesting to apply the methodology of this paper to other exhaustible resources.
For instance, data on natural gas, which has similar extraction cost properties as oil, could
be used to evaluate the model.
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Tables and Figures
Table 1: List of the Countries in the Cost and Demand Estimations
Albania1 Germany1;2;3 Portugal2;3
Algeria1;2 Greece2;3 Qatar1;2
Angola1 Hong Kong2 Romania1;2
Argentina1;2 Hungary1;2;3 Russian Federation1;2
Australia1;2;3 Iceland2;3 Saudi Arabia1;2
Austria2;3 India1;2 Singapore2
Azerbaijan1;2 Indonesia1;2 Slovak Republic2;3
Bahrain1 Iran1;2 South Africa2
Bangladesh2 Iraq1 South Korea2;3
Belarus2 Italy1;2;3 Spain2;3
Belgium2;3 Ireland2;3 Sudan1
Brazil1;2 Japan2;3 Sweden2;3
Brunei1 Kazakhstan1;2 Switzerland2;3
Bulgaria2 Kuwait1;2 Syrian Arab Republic1
Cameroon1 Libya1 Taiwan2
Canada1;2;3 Lithuania2 Thailand1;2
Chile1;2;3 Luxembourg2;3 Trinidad and Tobago1
China1;2 Malaysia1;2 Tunisia1
Colombia1;2 Mexico1;2;3 Turkey1;2;3
Congo, Republic1 Netherlands1;2;3 Turkmenistan1;2
Czech Republic2;3 New Zealand1;2;3 Ukraine2
Denmark1;2;3 Nigeria1 United Arab Emirates1;2
Ecuador1;2 Norway1;3 United Kingdom1;2;3
Egypt1;2 Oman1 United States1;2;3
Equatorial Guinea1 Pakistan2 Uzbekistan1;2
Finland2;3 Peru1;2 Venezuela1;2
France1;2;3 Philippines2 Vietnam1
Gabon1 Poland2;3 Yemen, Rep.1
Notes: The 57 countries that are included in the cost estimations of Section 4.2.1 are denoted by 1. The 65 countries that
are included in the Cross-sectionally augmented Pooled Mean Group (CPMG) analysis of Section 4.2.2 are denoted by 2. 3
indicates that the country is a member of the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) .
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Table 2: Denitions and Sources of Variables Used in Regression Analysis
Variable Denition and Construction Source
Authors construction using data from
Real GDP per Capita Ratio of GDP (in 2000 US$) to population. the World Bank (2010a) World
Development Indicators (WDI).
Reserves Quantities of oil that geological and
engineering information indicate with
reasonable certainty can be recovered in Authors calculation using data from
the future from known reservoirs under the British Petroleum (2010)
existing economic and operating conditions. Statistical Review of World Energy.
Prices Oil price (Brent) in US dollars per barrel.
Consumption per Capita Ratio of annual oil consumption in 1000
barrels to population.
Authors construction using data from
Production Annual oil production in barrels. the British Petroleum (2010)
Statistical Review of World Energy
and the OPEC (2010)
Cumulative Production Cumulative oil production in billion Annual Statistical Bulletin.
barrels per year.
Total Resource The sum of reserves and cumulative
production in billion barrels per year.
Average Cost Average cost of oil extraction in US dollars Authors construction using data from
per barrel. the World Bank (2010b)
Adjusted Net Saving Database.
CPI Consumer price index (2000=100) at Authors construction using data from
the end of the year. the International Monetary Fund (2012)
International Financial Statistics.
Notes:  GDP data for Taiwan was not available from World Bank (2010a) and was instead obtained from International
Monetary Fund (2012).
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Table 3: Summary Statistics on Oil Prices, Average Costs, Consumption, Ex-
traction, and Proven Reserves
Variable Mean Standard Minimum Maximum
Deviation
Real Oil Prices (Pt), 39.89 24.62 9.94 96.91
in 2009 US dollars.
Real Average Costs (ACt); 6.24 2.77 0.75 22.84
in 2009 US dollars.
World Oil Extraction (qt), 63.09 12.64 31.81 81.99
in million barrels per day.
World Oil Consumption (qdt ), 63.65 14.11 31.10 85.62
in million barrels per day.
World Proven Reserves (Rt), 1023.43 189.17 667.53 1333.13
in billion barrels.
World Proven Reserve to 40.32 3.72 29.05 45.68
Extraction Ratio, in years.
Notes: The data for proven reserves (Rt) and world proven reserve to extraction ratio are from 1980-2009, while the data for
real average cost are from 1975-2008, all other gures are based on data from 1965-2009. Authors calculations based on data
from British Petroleum (2010), World Bank (2010b), and OPEC (2010).
25
Figure 1: Share of Oil in Total Energy Consumption (in percent), 1965-2009
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Notes: Share of Oil is the share of oil consumption in total primary energy consumption and is in percent. Authors calculations
based on data from British Petroleum (2010).
Figure 2: World Oil Extraction and Consumption, 1965-2009
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Notes: Oil Extraction and Consumption are in million barrels per day. The gure is based on data from British Petroleum
(2010).
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Figure 3: Oil Prices in 2009 US Dollars, 1965-2009
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Notes: The gure is based on data from British Petroleum (2010).
Figure 4: Total Resource and Proven Reserves, 1980-2009
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Notes: Total resource and proven reserves are in billion barrels. Total resource is dened as the sum of proven reserves and
cumulative production at any given time. Authors calculations based on data from British Petroleum (2010) and OPEC (2010),
see Section 4.1 for more details.
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Table 4: Cost Function Estimation Results, 1975-2008
Pooled OLS Random E¤ects Fixed E¤ects
Marginal Cost 5:117 5:107 5:112
(0:049) (0:158) (0:046)
(Qit 1)2=qit 0:366 10 3 0:375 10 3 0:377 10 3 
0:028 10 3  0:044 10 3  0:047 10 3
No. Countries/Observation 1852 57/1852 57/1852
R
2
0.22 0.22 0.22
Notes: The dependent variable is the average cost of extraction, ACit. Standard errors are presented below the corresponding
coe¢ cients in brackets. Symbols ***, **, and * denote signicance at 1%, 5%, and at 10% respectively. The 57 countries used
in the cost estimations are denoted by 1 in Table 1. Source: Authors estimations, see Section 4.2.1 for more details.
Table 5: Demand Function Estimation Results, 1965-2009
CMG CPMG
Income Elasticity (b1) 0:932 0:678
(0:423) (0:034)
Price Elasticity (b2) 0:068  0:150
(0:335) (0:009)
Error Correction Term (b)  0:393  0:279
(0:047) (0:039)
No. Countries / No. Observations 65/2443 65/2443
Joint Hausman Test 0.74 [p = 0:69]
Notes: All estimations include a constant country specic term. Standard errors are presented below the corresponding
coe¢ cients in brackets. Symbols ***, **, and * denote signicance at 1%, 5%, and at 10% respectively. The dependent variable
is the growth rate of oil consumption per capita. The Schwarz Bayesian Criterion (SBC) has been used to select the lag
orders for each group in which the maximum lag is set to two. The p-value is presented next to the corresponding h-test in
square-brackets. Source: Authors estimations, see Section 4.2.2 for more details.
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Table 6: Terminal Price of Oil in 2009 US Dollars, 2000-2010
P t;Tt with  = 0:00075 P

t;Tt
with r = 0:015
Year TRt r = 0:01 r = 0:015 r = 0:02  = 0:00057  = 0:00094
2000 1984 154.60 104.77 79.85 80.25 129.26
2001 2035 158.50 107.37 81.81 82.22 132.50
2002 2123 165.14 111.79 85.12 85.55 138.01
2003 2164 168.21 113.84 86.66 87.09 140.56
2004 2198 170.78 115.56 87.95 88.39 142.70
2005 2238 173.73 117.53 89.42 89.87 145.15
2006 2281 176.97 119.69 91.04 91.50 147.84
2007 2330 180.68 122.16 92.90 93.36 150.92
2008 2439 188.91 127.64 97.01 97.50 157.76
2009 2470 191.22 129.18 98.16 98.66 159.67
2010 2513 194.48 131.36 99.80 100.30 162.38
Notes: Total reserves, TRt, are in billion barrels and are calculated as the sum of cumulative production and proven reserves, at
any point in time, using data from British Petroleum (2010) and OPEC (2010). The marginal cost, , is set equal to 5.11 based
on the estimations in Section 4.2.1. The 95 percent condence interval of  is used to calculate the fourth and fth columns.
Source: Authors estimations, see Section 4.3 for more details.
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Figure 5: Extraction (leftscale) and Price (rightscale) Proles, 2011-2044
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Notes: Authors estimations, see Section 5 for more details.
Figure 6: Extraction Proles with the Share of Oil Falling
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Notes: Oil extraction is in million barrels per day. The share of oil is assumed to be falling at the rate of X percentage points
per annum. Source: Authors estimations, see Section 5.2.1 for more details.
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Figure 7: EIA (2011-2035) and Model (2011-2049) Extraction Projections
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Notes: Oil extraction is in million barrels per day. Source: Authors estimations (see Section 5.2.1) and the Energy Informa-
tion Administration (2010) International Energy Outlook.
Figure 8: Price Proles with the Share of Oil Falling
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Notes: Oil prices are in 2009 US dollars. Source: Authors estimations, see Section 5.2.1 for more details.
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